Taqiyya and kitman are two fundamental concepts for understanding dissimulation in Islam: the possibility of concealing, rationing or distorting the truth when this is considered useful for defending Islam, protecting the Muslim community, conducting religious propaganda or dealing with non-Muslims.
According to this logic, taqiyya does not concern only the Muslim who is forced outwardly to renounce his faith in order to escape persecution. It may also concern the way Islam is presented in non-Islamic countries, in the Dar al-Harb, that is, in territories inhabited by kafir, the unbelievers. In these contexts, especially when Muslims are a minority or do not yet possess sufficient political strength, dissimulation can become a means of appearing moderate, reassuring and compatible with the host society.
The point is not to accuse every individual Muslim of lying on every single occasion. The problem is deeper: Islamic sources and tradition contain a doctrinal logic that can make dissimulation lawful when telling the whole truth about Islam would cast Islam itself in a bad light, hinder its public acceptance or damage the interests of the Muslim community.
This is why, in Western public debate, Islam is often presented as a religion of peace, dialogue, tolerance, equality and spirituality, while subjects such as offensive jihad, apostasy, the legal inferiority of women, polygamy, marriage to minors, slavery, dhimmitude, Sharia and doctrinal hostility towards unbelievers are concealed or minimised.
The Condemnation of Lying and Its Exceptions
At first sight, Islam too appears to condemn lying unequivocally. Like every religion that wishes to present itself as morally serious, Islamic preaching contains severe warnings against falsehood and deceit. But the decisive point, as often happens when Islamic sources are examined, is not to stop at the general principle: one must establish which exceptions are admitted, in what circumstances, against whom and in whose interest.
Muhammad spoke clearly about the importance of telling the truth:
“You must tell the truth, for truth leads to virtue and virtue leads to Paradise, and the person who always seeks the truth will eventually be recorded by Allah as an honest man. But refrain from lying, for lying leads to wickedness and wickedness leads to the fires of Hell, and the person who persists in lying will be recorded by Allah as a liar.” (Sahih Muslim 2607c)
Taken on its own, this passage would seem to end the discussion: truth leads to Paradise and lying to Hell. In Islamic sources, however, the picture is far less straightforward. Alongside the general condemnation of lying, there are cases in which deceit, dissimulation or concealment of the truth is admitted when it serves warfare, the protection of the Muslim community, the defence of Islam, religious propaganda or relations with non-Muslims perceived as hostile.
This is precisely where the problem arises: in Islam, lying does not always appear to be prohibited as such, but may become lawful when it is deemed useful to a higher purpose. The concepts of taqiyya and kitman belong within this logic: they are not merely polemical inventions by critics of Islam, but doctrines connected with the relationship between truth, prudence, religious defence, war, conquest and the public presentation of Islam.
The prohibition against lying, therefore, does not always appear as an absolute principle. Like many other Islamic rules, it seems to admit exceptions when lying is considered useful to a religious, political or military purpose. It is no coincidence that the force of certain moral rules often appears more binding in relations within the community of Muslim believers than in dealings with unbelievers or enemies of Islam.
Taqiyya and Kitman: Holy Hypocrisy
The term taqiyya denotes the concealment of one’s faith, intentions or adherence to Islam in certain circumstances. The related principle of kitman is often translated as “mental reservation”: it does not necessarily mean telling an explicit lie, but withholding the whole truth, concealing a decisive part of the information, presenting facts selectively and leading the other person astray.
The distinction is important. Taqiyya may consist in outwardly renouncing one’s faith or hiding one’s religious identity. Kitman, by contrast, may consist in rationing the truth: saying only what is advantageous, keeping silent about what would cast Islam in a bad light, showing only the reassuring face of the Islamic religion and concealing its doctrinal, legal and political face.
Taqiyya, therefore, is the practice of lying or dissimulating in the interest of Islam. Its purpose may be to deceive unbelievers by convincing them of Islam’s benevolence through the removal of doubts and concerns about the religion. Kitman can work even more subtly: not denying everything, but showing only what is advantageous to show.
One of the main arguments used by those who practise this form of propaganda is to present Islam as a religion perfectly compatible with Western freedom, democracy, equal rights and equal rights for women. But when one moves from slogans to Islamic sources, the picture becomes far less reassuring.
War Is Deception
Speaking about the enemies of the Muslims, Muhammad stated a principle markedly different from the general condemnation of lying:
“War is deception” (Sahih Bukhari – Volume 4, Book 56, Number 3030)
This saying is important because it shows that, at least in the context of war, deception is not merely tolerated but treated as part of strategy. The critical question is how far this principle remained confined to war and how far, in Islamic history and apologetic practice, it was extended to religious propaganda, public dialogue and relations with non-Muslims.
When war is deception, the boundary between moral truth and strategic utility becomes very thin. And when a religion also possesses political, military and legal dimensions, deception does not necessarily remain confined to the battlefield: it can become a method for presenting, defending and spreading the religious ideology.
An Example of Disinformation in Islamic Tradition
In Hamza Piccardo’s translation of the Quran, the commentary on the context of Quran 3:172 states:
“The account of the events relating to the battle of Uhud continues. […] an idolater, a friend of the Muslims, was charged with bringing false news to the Meccan camp, reporting the mobilisation of the entire city of Medina. Confused by the stratagem and the clever disinformation operation carried out by the Muslims, the Quraysh decided to return to Mecca as soon as possible.”
What is interesting is that the episode is presented without particular embarrassment: the disinformation operation is described as an effective expedient against the enemy. Once again, the problem is not the lie in itself but the context in which it is used and the purpose supposed to justify it.
The Quran and Dissimulation
The concept of taqiyya is often linked to the Quran as well. One of the most frequently cited verses is the following:
“Let not the believers take the unbelievers as allies rather than the believers. Whoever does that has nothing to do with Allah, unless you protect yourselves against them out of fear. Allah warns you against Himself. And to Allah is the destination.” (3:28)
Read without the lenses of Islamic apologetics, the verse clearly opens the door to dissimulation in relations with non-Muslims, especially when they are perceived as dangerous, hostile or opposed to the interests of the Islamic community. The exception is decisive: the believer should not prefer unbelievers to believers, but may adopt a prudent, strategic or apparently conciliatory attitude towards them when fearing harm.
In other words, the verse does not simply authorise free and transparent friendship with unbelievers; it introduces an exception connected with prudence, protection and fear. It is precisely upon this exception that the theme of taqiyya rests.
Another verse says:
“Whoever disbelieves in Allah after having believed—except one who is forced while his heart remains secure in faith—but those who willingly open their hearts to disbelief, upon them is wrath from Allah, and they will have a terrible punishment.” (16:106)
Here the principle appears even clearer: a believer under compulsion may outwardly renounce the faith, provided that he preserves it inwardly. This kind of logic gives rise to the concept of taqiyya, namely the concealment of one’s faith or convictions in order to avoid harm.
Dar al-Harb, Kafir and Ideological Infiltration
Taqiyya takes on a particularly disturbing meaning when it is connected with relations between Islam and non-Islamic territories. In classical Islamic tradition, the world is often conceived through categories such as Dar al-Islam, the house of Islam, and Dar al-Harb, the house of war, meaning the space not yet subjected to Islamic order.
From this perspective, non-Islamic territories are not simply “other countries” with which one is to coexist peacefully and permanently. They are territories inhabited by kafir, unbelievers, and may be regarded as spaces to be influenced, penetrated, converted, weakened or conquered, depending on historical circumstances and the balance of power.
This is where dissimulation becomes a decisive instrument. When Islam is weak, in a minority or viewed with social suspicion, it is not advantageous to present it as it emerges from its most inconvenient sources. It is advantageous to appear moderate, reassuring, spiritual, open to dialogue and a victim of prejudice. It is advantageous to speak of peace, love and tolerance. It is advantageous to deny or minimise everything that might alarm the host society.
This is not merely a matter of politeness or personal prudence. It is a communication strategy: presenting a domesticated Islam to outsiders, compatible with everything, while the classical Islamic sources tell a different story.
Taqiyya as Islamic Propaganda in the West
Taqiyya should not be understood only as the act of a Muslim who conceals his faith to avoid persecution. In the contemporary world, it may also appear in Islamic propaganda directed at Western societies.
One of the chief aims of this propaganda is to convince unbelievers of Islam’s benevolence by removing doubts, fears and concerns. Islam is presented as a religion of peace, respect, tolerance, equality and rights. It is repeated that anyone who criticises Islam is racist, ignorant, Islamophobic or a victim of propaganda. It is claimed that problems never derive from Islam, but only from bad interpretations, local culture, politics, colonialism, poverty or the errors of individuals.
The script is always the same: “that is not true Islam”, “Islam means peace”, “that verse is out of context”, “Muhammad respected women”, “Sharia is justice”, “jihad is only an inner struggle”, “Islam protects minorities”, “Muslims have always respected Jews and Christians”.
Kitman, in this sense, becomes even more effective than a direct lie. It is not always necessary to say what is false: it is enough to select one part of the truth and conceal the rest. It is enough to cite the most convenient verses and remain silent about the most inconvenient ones. It is enough to talk about peaceful Muslims and not about the doctrine. It is enough to display the brochure version of Islam and conceal the Islam of the sources.
This video shows a classic example of taqiyya: statements circulated publicly with the intention of presenting aspects of Islam that do not reflect the reality of its sources and history.
When Islam Is a Minority: Appearing Moderate
When Muslims are a minority and politically weak, the public presentation of Islam tends to be reassuring. There is talk of integration, dialogue, coexistence, respect for the law, pluralism and peace. Much less is said about apostasy, offensive jihad, the legal inferiority of women, polygamy, marriage to minors, slavery, dhimmitude, corporal punishment, the supremacy of Sharia and doctrinal hostility towards unbelievers.
Not because these subjects are inventions by critics of Islam, but because naming them openly would make the social acceptance of Islam in the West much more difficult. In certain societies and historical phases, telling the whole truth about Islam would compromise Islam’s public image.
The preference is therefore to present an Islam compatible with everything: democracy, religious freedom, equality between men and women, individual rights, freedom of conscience and separation of religion and state. Yet when one moves from public declarations to Islamic sources, the picture becomes far less reassuring.
This mechanism is also connected with stages, numbers and balances of power: an Islam in a minority tends to present itself in one way; an Islam with greater social and political strength can afford to speak and act in another. On this point, see also Why Don’t Two Billion Muslims Kill Us All?.
Dissimulation in Public Discourse
Dissimulation does not consist only in renouncing one’s faith under threat. It may also appear in public discourse, when a representative of Islam carefully avoids saying what, if stated openly, would cast Islam in a bad light within the society in which he is speaking.
In such cases it is not necessary to lie crudely. It is enough to omit, soften, divert attention, present as marginal what is central in the sources, or present as obsolete what remains perfectly recognisable in the Islamic legal tradition.
There is then talk of peace, dialogue, coexistence, respect, spirituality, family and values. Much less is said about what would make Islam difficult to accept in a free society: relations with unbelievers, Sharia, apostasy, jihad, women, religious freedom, criticism of Muhammad and the subordination of non-Muslims.
The problem, therefore, is not to determine whether every individual Muslim spokesman is lying on every single occasion. The problem is far more serious: Islam possesses in its sources a doctrine that can make it religiously legitimate to conceal, distort or ration the truth when doing so serves the defence of Islam, the protection of the Muslim community or its gradual expansion.
Taqiyya and the Idea That the Unbeliever Lies
This form of sanctification of dishonesty is justified by many Islamic apologists through the conviction that anyone who opposes Islam is lying about or defaming the “True Faith”. For those who regard Islam as an evident, perfect and rational truth, rejecting Islam cannot be the result of a sincere search for truth: it must be ignorance, obstinacy, bad faith or immorality.
Frithjof Schuon described this attitude as follows:
“The intellectual and therefore rational foundations of Islam have the effect in the average Muslim of producing the curious tendency to believe that non-Muslims either know that Islam is the truth and therefore reject it out of pure obstinacy, or are simply ignorant of it and can therefore be converted by elementary explanations; the fact that someone may wish to oppose Islam with a clear conscience lies far beyond the Muslim imagination, precisely because Islam coincides in their minds with the irresistible logic of things.”
These words help explain why the arguments of Islamic apologists are often elementary, repetitive, circular and almost childish. They also help explain why, when refuted, many Islamic apologists quickly resort to insults, accusations of racism or denunciations of “Islamophobia”.
For many Muslims, the idea that an unbeliever may reject Islam on the basis of a sincere search for truth is inconceivable. If Islam is the evident truth, anyone who rejects it must be blind, ignorant or a liar. And if the unbeliever lies against Islam, it then becomes legitimate to use against him the weapon of dissimulation, propaganda and partial truth.
Taqiyya Beyond Propaganda
Taqiyya goes beyond a merely propagandistic purpose. The etymological origin of the word refers to the idea of protecting or preserving oneself and keeping oneself safe. It therefore also includes personal dissimulation: giving the impression of not being religious, avoiding suspicion, appearing integrated, or outwardly adopting conduct contrary to Islamic practice when this is considered necessary or useful.
Under such false appearances, a Muslim may, in certain contexts, conceal his faith, verbally renounce Islam or behave outwardly in a non-Islamic manner, provided that he does not truly intend to renounce the faith in his heart.
If the ultimate result of a lie or dissimulation is perceived as useful to Islam, to the protection of the Muslim community or to the conversion of unbelievers to submission to Allah, the lie may then be justified through the logic of taqiyya.
A Case in the Hadith: Permission to Lie in Order to Kill Ka’b bin al-Ashraf
Various hadiths show that the principle of lying being permitted for an Islamic purpose was already put into practice by the very first generation of Muslims:
Narrated by Jabir Abdullah:
Allah’s Messenger said: “Who is ready to kill Ka’b bin al-Ashraf? He has spoken abusively and harmed Allah and His Apostle.” Maslamah stood up and said: “Would you like me to kill him?” The Prophet declared: “Yes.” Maslamah said: “Then permit me to lie so that I may deceive him.” Muhammad said: “You may do so.” (Sahih Bukhari – Volume 5, Book 59, Number 369)
This episode is particularly significant because permission to lie is not granted in an abstract situation, but as part of a concrete action against an enemy of Muhammad. Here too, lying is not treated as an absolute evil, but as a permitted instrument when it serves a purpose deemed superior.
Taqiyya and Dialogue with Islam
It is also because of this doctrine that a sincere attempt at “dialogue” with Islam becomes extremely difficult. If one party considers it legitimate to conceal part of the truth when it believes that it is defending Islam, the exchange no longer takes place on fully transparent ground.
This principle must always be kept firmly in mind when we see a spokesman for Islam on television professing friendship towards unbelievers and loyalty to the laws of the state in which he lives, or the peaceful and democratic nature of Islam.
The legitimate question is not whether that individual spokesman is necessarily lying at that precise moment. The real question is different: is he telling the whole truth about Islam? Is he also discussing its inconvenient sources? Is he explaining what the Quran, hadith, sira, tafsir and classical jurisprudence teach about relations with unbelievers, Sharia, women, apostasy and war? Or is he presenting only the export version of Islam, constructed for acceptance by those who do not know the sources?
“In the history of Sunnism, taqiyya has never fallen into disuse, even among the most scrupulous.” [Dizionario del Corano, edited by Mohammad Ali Amir-Moezzi, Mondadori, p. 219]
This practice is especially prominent in Shia doctrine because, throughout their history, Shias have suffered more than others from violence within the Muslim world. Reducing taqiyya solely to Shiism would nevertheless be misleading: more generally, the problem concerns the relationship between truth, prudence, religious interest and the defence of the Islamic community.
The historical archive of Panorama carried a report by Silvia Grilli on the case of the dissimulator Tariq Ramadan, entitled C’è un islam che vuole convertirci. The old direct archive link is no longer properly accessible today.
Conclusion: The Problem Is Not the Occasional Lie, but the Doctrine
Every religion and ideology may have inconsistent followers, propagandists and liars. The problem with Islam, however, is deeper: it does not concern only the individual conduct of some Muslims, but the presence of doctrinal principles that can justify dissimulation when it serves the protection, defence or expansion of Islam.
Taqiyya and kitman are not marginal details. They are instruments through which Islam can present itself differently according to context, audience, numerical strength and the balance of power. When Islam is weak, it can appear conciliatory; when it is strong, it can afford to be more explicit. When speaking to the West it can speak of peace; when speaking through its own sources, the language changes.
This is precisely why anyone who wants to understand Islam must not stop at the public statements of its spokesmen, but must return to the sources: the Quran, hadith, sira, tafsir and Islamic jurisprudence. That is where the mask falls.
